The Threats to Israel and Israel's Deterrence

I just attended the exciting Jerusalem Conference on Mt. Scopus. The presentations were excellent, the atmosphere was electric, and what more needs to be said other than Prof. Bernard Lewis delivered a fascinating tour d'horizon of the Middle East.

At the conference I served as a last-minute substitute as chairman for a panel, "Israel’s Strategic and Tactical Defense: Defining IDF Doctrine, Goals and Deterrence Capabilities." Below are my remarks:

I want to raise several questions about deterrence when applied to Israel and its neighbors.

Deterrence is defined as “being prepared to inflict unacceptable damage on an aggressor, and making sure the potential aggressor is aware of the risk so that he refrains from aggression.” In the words of President Theodore Roosevelt, “Speak softly and carry a big stick.” Policymakers in Israel need to know that it does not mean “speak too much and carry a twig.”

There are several threats facing Israel for which Israel requires deterrence capabilities, and those threats and the corresponding deterrence are not the same.

The first threat is the terrorist threat represented by the suicide bomber, the car bomb, and the Kassam rocket.

The second threat is the conventional armies of Israel's neighbors – the tanks, the planes, the infantry divisions of the Syrian or Egyptian armies.

An offshoot of this threat which has now grown into a third distinct threat is the asymmetrical warfare employed by Hizbullah in the second Lebanon war. The terrorist Hamas is attempting to carry out such warfare. A switch from Kassam rockets to Katyushas would represent such a transformation. The training and force restructure being undertaken by Hamas with Iranian and Hizbullah help is another part of the attempted transformation.

The forth threat is the over-the-horizon threat of missiles and non-conventional warheads such as the Iraqi Scuds or the missile arsenal being built in Iran.

What deterrence capabilities does Israel possess to meet these threats?

The over-the-horizon threat of missiles and non-conventional weapons are deterred by Israel’s long-arm ability, and it was strengthened by the alleged recent air raid on a mysterious facility in Syria, a new advanced spy satellite, and a recent missile test. Presumably, the Iranians recognize Israel’s long-range air and naval capabilities, and presumably (admittedly a large presumption) the Iranians are, in the end, rational players not seeking mutually-assured destruction. Nevertheless, during the first Gulf War, when Scuds rained down on Israel, Israel’s deterrence ability was proven to be worthless. Saddam Hussein was not deterred, and if Israel was planning to respond, the American government tied Israel’s hands. The message was conveyed that missiles can be fired at Israel’s cities with impunity and no cost. I should add that the threat of international sanctions has seemingly had little impact on Iran’s nonconventional military planning.

The threat of the conventional war along the lines of the 1973 Yom Kippur War or parts of the 1982 Peace for Galilee campaign is a battle of planes versus planes, tanks versus tanks. It is quite possible a thing of the past, and Israel’s clear supremacy serves as a deterrent. Nevertheless, Anwar Sadat’s threat to sacrifice a million men to recapture the Sinai should never be forgotten. Deterrence theory relies on a rational player on the other side.

The asymmetrical threats were addressed in the Winograd report investigating the summer 2006 war in Lebanon. How does an army with its heavy equipment, heavy command structure and heavy logistics requirements fight a small, indigenous, well-trained, and well-equipped guerrilla force? How does an army respond to batteries of missiles hidden amidst large civilian populations? The Israeli Air Force did destroy large long-range Hizbullah rockets, but again, missiles were fired at Israel’s cities with impunity. Since then the Hizbullah missile arsenal has been replaced. Can Hizbullah be deterred by the targeting of its leaders such as Imad Mughniyah? Some argue that Israel’s ability to punish the host country – in this case Lebanon – serves as a deterrent, but Israel has pounded Lebanon’s infrastructure on numerous occasions over the last 30 years, and the threat remains.

Lastly, what deterrence is there against the terrorists? Not much, if the terrorist believes that he – or she – will be rewarded with a better life. Intelligence can work to thwart the terrorist. Threats to harm a terrorist's home or family could stop a terrorist if intelligence services can issue a targeted warning in time. Does the physical targeting of terrorist leaders, as Israel did with Hamas leaders Sheikh Ahmed Yassin and Abdel Aziz Rantisi, deter terrorist attacks? Are sanctions or economic blockades a deterrent? Israel’s attempts to close down Gaza were met with an international outcry and Hamas’ destruction of the Gaza-Egyptian border.

I close with a question: Is Israel destined to remain, as coined by Prime Minister Levi Eshkol, “Shimshon der nebuchdicker” – the powerful, yet powerless, Samson?

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